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The North-East Arctic cod fishery is of economic and cultural importance. The stock is subject 
to joint management by Norway and Russia. Today’s stock management strategy is designed 
to achieve the maximum sustainable yield given the current selection pattern. The current 
selection pattern is largely determined by the fleet-composition, i.e. the distribution of the total 
allowable catch in terms of shares. By use of an age-structured, multi-fleet, bioeconomic model, 
it is shown that the stock has biological potential that cannot be realized with today’s 
management. The same goes for the economic potential of the Norwegian part of the fishery. 
Biological gains in terms of an increase in the sustainable yield may be achieved by altering the 
overall selection pattern through changes in the fleet-composition. Economic gains in terms of 
an increase in the net present value of the Norwegian part of the fishery may be achieved by 
changing the fleet-composition and reducing the overall fishing pressure.   
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1.1 North-East Arctic Cod 
North-East Arctic (NEA) cod forms the world’s largest cod stock (Helgesen et al. 2018). It is 
of great economic and cultural importance (Eide et al. 2013; Armstrong et al. 2014; 
Fiskeridirektoratet 2009-2018)1. The stock has been subject to overfishing, but strict 
management and good climatic conditions have ensured that the stock is now in relatively good 
condition compared to earlier years (ICES 2018)2.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution and migration pattern of the NEA cod. The mature part of the 
population migrates between the feeding grounds in the Barents Sea and the spawning grounds 
of the Lofoten Islands in the Norwegian Sea (Armstrong et al. 2014). It accumulates in the 
spawning grounds in the period that stretches from January to April each year. Eggs and fish 
larvae drift from the spawning grounds to the Barents Sea along with the ocean currents. The 
immature part of the population grazes in the Barents Sea until it becomes sexually mature.  
 
Figure 1: Map showing the distribution and migration pattern of NEA cod (Source: Armstrong et al. (2014)) 
                                                          
1 In 2017, the harvest totaled at 868 thousand tons and the spawning stock biomass was estimated at about 1.8 
million tons (ICES 2018). Assuming the average price for the Norwegian part of the fishery was representative for 
the entire NEA cod fishery, the first-hand value of the total harvest in 2017 is estimated at about 14 billion 
Norwegian Krones (Fiskeridirektoratet 2009-2018).  
2 In the period 1998-2008, the average yearly total harvest and average yearly total spawning stock biomass (SSB) 
was 522 thousand tons and 513 thousand tons, respectively (ICES, 2018). In the period 2009-2018, the average 
yearly total harvest and average yearly SSB was about 759 thousand tons and 1.9 million tons, respectively.  
2 
 
NEA cod is a top predator. Capelin, herring and different benthic organisms serve as important 
sources of food (Hjermann et al. 2006). It is also cannibalistic - older individuals are inclined 
to feed on younger individuals, especially when the availability of other sources of food is 
scarce (Yaragina et al. 2009). Young cod (age 0-2) feed mainly on zooplankton (Dalpadado & 
Bogstad 2004). 
 
1.2 The North-East Arctic Cod Fishery 
The NEA cod stock is managed jointly by Norway and Russia through a bilateral fisheries 
commission (NFD 2018). Every year, a total quota is set, and this is distributed between vessels 
that fall into three broad groups; Norwegian conventional vessels3, Norwegian trawlers, and 
Russian and third countries’ trawlers. The Russian and third countries’ trawlers typically get 
55-57.5% of the total quota, while the Norwegian part of the fishery gets the remaining share 
(Diekert et al 2010; JNRFC n.e.)4. A distribution key called “Trålstigen”, which translates to 
“The trawl ladder”, determines the distribution of the Norwegian share of the total quota as a 
function of its size (NOU 2016). The trawl share is rising from 27 per cent when the quota is 
low to 33 per cent when the quota is high.  
The current stock management strategy is designed to achieve the maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY) given the current selection pattern (Garcia et al. 2018; Eikeset et al. 2012). The different 
vessel groups operate with different gears and in various geographical areas. Therefore, they 
target different age groups in the stock. Hence, the overall selection pattern is largely 
determined by today’s fleet-composition, i.e. today’s distribution of the TAC in terms of shares. 
Also important are operational restrictions concerning gear and the vessel groups’ operational 
access to different geographical areas.  
Most vessels in the Norwegian conventional fleet operate on the spawning grounds off the 
Lofoten Islands during the spawning-season. Hence, they naturally target the older and mature 
part of the stock.  
                                                          
3 The Norwegian conventional fleet consists of two distinctive sub-groups; the coastal fleet and conventional 
ocean-going vessels. The conventional ocean-going vessels constitute a relatively small share of the Norwegian 
conventional fleet in terms of harvest. For simplicity, and to avoid confusion, the conventional fleet is used 
synonymously with the coastal fleet throughout this paper.  
4 Historically, 10-15% of the total quota has been allocated to third countries. The remaining share of the total 
quota has then been split equally between Norway and Russia.  
3 
 
Russian and third countries’ trawlers operate in the Barents Sea. The same goes for Norwegian 
trawlers. However, the Norwegian trawlers operate further west than most of the vessels in the 
Russian and third countries’ trawler fleet (see e.g. attachment 13a and 13b to JNRFC (2018)). 
Norwegian trawlers may also operate relatively close to the spawning grounds during the 
spawning-season. Since both trawler fleets operate in the Barents Sea, where the immature part 
of the population grazes, they target a younger part of the population than the Norwegian 
conventional fleet. Because the Norwegian trawlers operate further west and closer to the main 
spawning grounds than the Russian and third countries’ trawler fleet, they naturally target older 
individuals compared to the Russian and third countries’ trawler fleet. 
  
1.3 Motivation  
Bioeconomic theory indicates that alternative strategies concerning the determination of the 
total quota could increase the sustainable economic yield and net present value of the fishery 
(see e.g. Gordon 1954). When harvesting is density-dependent, as it often is for shoaling 
species5 such as the NEA cod, it may be economically optimal to stabilize the stock at a higher 
level than the one associated with the MSY. The rationale is that an increase in the size of the 
stock gives rise to an increase in the harvest per unit effort which induces a reduction in the 
harvest costs per kg. Although such a strategy gives a lower yield than the MSY, it may generate 
a significant increase in the sustainable economic yield and net present value of the fishery.  
Moreover, biological and bioeconomic studies on the NEA cod fishery indicate that today’s 
selection pattern is biologically and economically inefficient (Helgesen et al. 2018; Diekert et 
al. 2010; Kvamme & Bogstad 2007). Biological and economic gains could be achieved by 
targeting older and heavier fish, i.e. by sparing younger fish for future harvest.  
Changes in the selection pattern can be achieved in several ways, for example by changing the 
fleet-composition, altering the gear restrictions and/or changing the restrictions concerning the 
vessel groups’ operational access to different geographical areas. In this paper, I focus on the 
effects of changing the fleet-composition, i.e. the distribution of the TAC in terms of shares.  
                                                          
5 In biology, a group of fish swimming in the same direction in a coordinated matter are schooling, while a group 
of fish that stay together for social reasons are shoaling.  
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1.4 Links to Literature 
Helgesen et al. (2018) present a stage-structured, multi-fleet, bioeconomic model inspired by 
the NEA cod fishery. The model structures the population in two groups, immatures and 
matures. It includes two fleets: the Norwegian conventional fleet and the Norwegian trawler 
fleet. They study both perfect and imperfect selectivity. When studying perfect selectivity, the 
conventional fleet targets only mature individuals, while the trawler fleet targets only immature 
individuals. When studying imperfect selectivity, the fleets experience bycatch, i.e. mixed 
catches. By using the model, they study the concepts of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and 
the dynamic equivalent, which they label maximum yield (MY). In all scenarios, they find that 
it is optimal to prioritize harvest of the mature part of the stock. In most cases, in their study, 
this involves utilizing only the conventional fleet. At high levels of bycatch, however, they 
show that it is optimal to utilize only the trawler fleet. Furthermore, they find that distribution 
keys (such as “Trålstigen”) may result in sub-optimal fishing schemes, generating efficiency 
losses. The model presented by Helgesen et al. (2018) does not include fishing costs and does 
not study the concepts of maximum sustainable economic yield (MEY) and maximum net 
present value (MNPV)6.    
Although certain changes in the fleet-composition may have the desired effect on the overall 
selection pattern and lead to an increase in the realization of the stocks’ growth potential, it may 
prove to be economically inefficient to implement said changes (Skonhoft et al. 2012). A vessel 
group with an inefficient selection pattern may experience lower harvest costs per kilo than a 
vessel group with a more efficient selection pattern. The utilization of the vessel group with the 
efficient selection pattern, at the expense of the utilization of the vessel group with the 
inefficient selection pattern, will lead to an increase in the realization of the growth potential of 
the stock. However, since the vessel group with the inefficient selection pattern experiences 
lower harvest costs per kg than the vessel group with the efficient selection pattern, the overall 
result may be a reduction in the sustainable economic yield and net present value of the fishery. 
In other words, it is not always economically optimal to increase the realization of the growth 
potential of a fish stock.  
Diekert et al. (2010) present an age-structured, multi-fleet, bioeconomic model of the NEA cod 
fishery. The model includes three fleets; the Norwegian conventional fleet, the Norwegian 
                                                          
6 I make an important distinction between MEY and MNPV. While MEY is defined as the maximum sustainable 
economic yield, which involves steady-state fishing, the MNPV is defined as the maximum net present value. 
Although MNPV fishing may be coinciding with MEY fishing, it may also be associated with fishing schemes 
that do not involve steady-state fishing – it may, for example, involve pulse fishing. 
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trawler fleet and the Russian trawler fleet. By use of the model, they estimate that the fishery 
could more than double its net present value (NPV) by targeting older and heavier fish by 
increasing mesh-size and reducing the overall effort without changing the fleet-composition 
significantly. Moreover, they show that optimal harvesting policies would lead to a much more 
robust and abundant cod stock. When maximizing the NPV of the fishery with effort as the only 
control variables, they find pulse fishing to be optimal. In this scenario, they find that it is 
optimal to change the fleet-composition so that the Norwegian conventional fleet constitutes a 
smaller share of the total fleet in terms of harvest. While Diekert et al. (2010) provide interesting 
and valuable results related to the potential of the NEA cod fishery by applying optimal mesh-
size and effort levels, little attention has been directed towards practical management questions 
concerning the allocation of the total quota. Furthermore, little is said about the differences 
between optimal and sub-optimal fishing schemes. Such differences could be of great interest 
for fishery managers, the industry, politicians and the public7. 
Sumaila (1997) also presents an interesting and relevant study. Using a game theoretic 
framework combined with an age-structured model, he investigates the economic benefits that 
can be realized from the NEA cod stock, and the effect of exploitation on stock sustainability 
under cooperation and non-cooperation between trawlers and conventional vessels. Given the 
data available at the time, he shows that the optimum optimorum is obtained under cooperation 
between the fleets. It involves side payments and no predetermined harvest shares, in which 
case the conventional fleet buys out the trawler fleet and becomes the producer of the optimum 
optimorum. However, his sensitivity analysis shows that the trawler fleet will take over as the 
optimum optimorum producer if the price premium assumed for mature fish is taken away.  
 
1.5 The Trawl Ladder Debate 
For the sake of enlightenment: there is currently an ongoing Norwegian public debate 
concerning whether “Trålstigen” should be maintained. As the Norwegian conventional fleet is 
known to deliver higher-quality raw material and create more jobs in coastal communities than 
                                                          
7 The aim of Norwegian fisheries management is to ensure sustainability, profitability and employment in coastal 
societies (Havressurslova 2008). This study considers sustainability and the first-hand profits in the Norwegian 
part of the NEA cod fishery. However, also important is employment in coastal societies and the profitability in 
the rest of the industry, including processing, etc. Choosing management strategies that involves increased first-
hand profits may have a negative effect on employment in coastal societies. It may also lead to a reduction in the 
profits in the rest of the industry (Christensen 2010). Furthermore, and since there is joint international 
management of the NEA cod, it may be difficult to implement optimal management strategies.  These aspects 
make it worthwhile to investigate several management scenarios, also those which are sub-optimal.  
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the Norwegian trawler fleet, many argue that the conventional fleet should get more of the 
Norwegian share of the total allowable catch (TAC) (see e.g. Fylkesnes 2019).  Others argue 
that “Trålstigen” should be maintained because the Norwegian trawler fleet plays an important 
role in the year-round supply of raw-material and the year-round employment (see e.g. 
Martinsen & Lysvold 2016). In addition, many seem to believe that the Norwegian trawler fleet 
is better than the Norwegian conventional fleet in terms of first-hand profitability (see e.g. 
Jensen 2019) - likely because it typically experiences higher profit margins than the Norwegian 
conventional fleet (Fiskeridirektoratet 2009-2018).  However, the results presented by Helgesen 
et al. (2018) and Sumaila (1997) indicate that this need not imply that it is economically optimal 
to maintain “Trålstigen” or allocate more of the Norwegian share of the TAC to the Norwegian 
trawler fleet.  It could be economically optimal to allocate more to the Norwegian conventional 
fleet. Although the debate is more complex than outlined here, it is explained sufficiently to 
understand that the distribution of the Norwegian share of the TAC is a hot topic and that the 
debate might be partly characterized by misconceptions.    
 
1.6 Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to provide a policy-relevant, bioeconomic analysis of 
different management strategies concerning the determination and allocation of the total quota 
for NEA cod. To do so, I have developed an age-structured, multi-fleet, bioeconomic model for 
the NEA cod fishery. It includes the Norwegian conventional fleet, the Norwegian trawler fleet, 
and Russian and third countries’ trawler fleet. While the biological part of the model and the 
harvest functions describe the whole fishery, the economic part is limited to describe the 
Norwegian part of the fishery. Hence, the paper takes on a Norwegian perspective. The model 
is used to provide estimates on MSY, MEY and MNPV subject to different constraints 
concerning the distribution of the TAC in terms of shares. In this paper, I present the model and 
its numerical specifications. Furthermore, I present, compare and discuss the key results 
generated by the model.   
Although the numerical specification of the model is based on statistical analysis, the model 
should not be viewed as a predictive model. Due to fundamental uncertainties in marine 
systems, other differences between model and reality, and the rough approaches used in the 
estimation of several parameters, the results should be interpreted as ceteris paribus 




The paper adds to the work done by Helgesen et al. (2018) by adding detail, and by including 
costs and the study of MEY and MNPV. Furthermore, it adds to the work done by Diekert et 
al. (2010) in several ways. Firstly, I present an alternative age-structured, multi-fleet, 
bioeconomic model for the NEA cod fishery. Amongst other things, I endogenize the natural 
mortality for younger age groups and weight at age for several age groups – in accordance with 
the state-of-the-art in single-species biological modeling of this species (Kovalev & Bogstad 
2005),  Secondly, the numerical specification of the model is based on statistical analysis of 
recent data (which contain data points outside the range of the data Diekert et al. (2010) had 
access to at the time). Thirdly, I include the study of MSY. I also make an important distinction 
between MEY and MNPV to investigate potential differences between optimal steady-state 
fishing schemes and potentially optimal cyclical fishing schemes. Lastly, I shift the focus from 
management questions concerning the choice of mesh-size to practical management questions 
concerning the distribution of the total quota in terms of shares. Moreover, the paper adds to 
the work done by Sumaila (1997) by presenting an alternative type of model and providing an 
analysis based on recent data. The paper may inform the ongoing Norwegian debate concerning 
whether “Trålstigen” should be maintained.  
 
1.8 Outline 
Section 2 accounts for the significance of gear selectivity. Section 3 summarizes the model and 
its numerical specifications. Section 4 explains how the model is used to simulate different 
management scenarios. Section 5 presents, compares and discusses key results generated by the 
model. Section 6 concludes the work.  
 
2 The Significance of Gear Selectivity  
Gear selectivity refers to a fishing method’s ability to target and harvest fish by size/age from 
a fish stock during a fishing operation. In other words, a gears’ selectivity refers to its selection 
pattern. Understanding the significance of gear selectivity is essential for understanding the 
results generated by the model presented in this thesis. Diekert et al. (2010) explain the 
significance of gear selectivity by presenting a pedagogical thought experiment – one that I will 




2.1 A Stylized Thought Experiment 
Imagine a large tank filled with water. Then imagine that a number of fish is put in the tank. 
For now, assume that the fish is infertile so that there will be no natural reproduction in the 
tank. Each individual gains weight by age, but the number of fish declines as time passes due 
to natural mortality. The overall biomass of fish in the tank will grow in the beginning, assuming 
the individual growth is sufficiently high relative to the natural mortality. After some time, 
however, the overall biomass will level out and then decrease. If harvesting is done without any 
costs, all fish should be harvested, and the problem is reduced to when this should be done. The 
obvious answer, from an economic perspective, is to harvest all the fish when the value of the 
cohort reaches its maximum. The maximum value of the cohort will depend on the net-growth 
function of the cohort and on the price per kg of fish, which may be increasing with age. The 
optimal timing of harvest will change if we apply a discount rate, if harvesting is not costless, 
or if it is not possible to harvest all the fish at once or at all. When fish is harvested before it 
reaches its optimal age, the stock is subject to growth-overfishing.  
Now imagine that a new cohort is introduced at the beginning of each period. The value of the 
stock will then equal the sum of the value of each cohort. If all other things are equal to the first 
scenario presented, and it is possible to perfectly select the fish of a specific age, the problem 
is identical to the single cohort-problem presented above. The gear should be designed to target 
the fish of the optimal age, and all fish of optimal age should be harvested every period 
(Beverton & Holt 1957). However, if the gear is completely non-selective, the best thing to do 
is to empty the tank and let the stock recover, and then repeat the process (see e.g. Hannesson 
1975; Tahvonen 2009; Golubtsov & Steinshamn 2019). This is called pulse fishing. Although 
pulse fishing might prove to be an optimal fishing strategy in a bioeconomic model analysis, 
the strategy may be associated with high social and private costs (Helgesen et al. 2018).  
In the real world, things are more complex. In fisheries, there exist neither perfect selectivity 
nor completely non-selective gears. Instead there often exist different types of vessels fishing 
with different types of gear in various geographical areas, targeting different age groups of the 
stock. And clearly, harvesting is not costless, and different types of vessels may experience 
both differences in costs and prices.  
Returning to the example, assume that there are two types of gear that can be used to harvest 
fish from the tank and that there is no room for altering the design of the gear. Furthermore, 
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assume that the value of a cohort reaches its maximum at age 8. Then assume that the first type 
of gear harvests fish of age 6, while the second type of gear harvests fish of age 8. When 
harvesting is costless and there is no time preference in terms of a discount rate, the obvious 
choice would be to choose the gear that harvests the fish of age 8 and spare all other fish for 
future periods. However, if we apply a positive discount rate, or the cost of harvesting is not 
costless and the cost of applying the different types of gear varies, the choice is more 
ambiguous. If the discount rate is sufficiently high, or the cost of using the first type of gear is 
sufficiently low relative to the cost of using the second type of gear, it will be optimal to use 
the first type of gear instead of the second one.   
In the real world, harvesting also often has an impact on the reproduction potential of the stock 
– in many cases, a reduction in the spawning stock biomass will lead to a reduction in future 
recruitment to the stock, and this also has implications for the optimal fishing strategy. Recall 
the last scenario presented in the paragraph above. Instead of assuming the fish is infertile, 
assume now that it becomes fertile when it reaches the age of 7, and that the number of sexually 
mature individuals determines the recruitment in the next period. Then assume that harvesting 
is not costless and that the cost of applying the first gear is much lower than applying the second 
gear. When studying the scenario from a single-cohort perspective, it could be optimal to use 
only the first type of gear due to lower cost and harvest all the fish at age 6. However, if this is 
done for all cohorts, there will be no reproduction since no individuals grow old enough to 
become sexually mature and contribute to future recruitment. This is called recruitment-
overfishing. Taking this into account, it could be optimal to use both types of gear or only the 
second one. Furthermore, the optimal strategy could involve continuous fishing activity or pulse 
fishing.    
Although the real world is much more complex than outlined here, the above thought 
experiment provides valuable insight that is essential for optimal management of fish stocks, 
and understanding the model and results presented in this paper.  
 
3 The Model 
The model presented here consists of a biological dimension, an economic dimension and 
harvest functions. The biological part describes biologic details such as processes of growth, 
maturation, mortality and recruitment. The economic part describes economic details such as 
costs and prices. The fleet-structure in the model is three-folded: Fleet 1 denotes the Norwegian 
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trawler fleet, Fleet 2 denotes the Norwegian conventional fleet and Fleet 3 denotes the Russian 
and third countries’ trawler fleet. The harvest functions for these fleets form the link between 
the biological and economic dimensions. While the biological part and harvest functions 
describe the whole fishery, the economic part is limited to describe the Norwegian part of the 
fishery – in other words, no economic details are described for fleet 3. The numerical 
specification of the model is based on statistical analysis. The model is set up in MS Excel. 
Stata and MS Excel have been used as statistical tools for the numerical specifications.  
 
3.1 The Biological Sub-Model 
3.1.1 Age Structure 
The NEA cod may reach an age of 24 years and a weight of 40 kg (Diekert et al. 2010; Aglen 
et al. 2004). However, few fish survive to the age of 12 years due to natural mortality and high 
fishing pressure (ICES 2018). The age-structure in the model has therefore been defined from 
age class 3 to age class 13+. This means that recruitment to the stock happens when the fish 
becomes 3 years old. Age class 13+ includes all individuals that are 13 years and older. In 
retrospect, one or two more age classes should have been included. When too few age classes 
are included, the model can underestimate the growth potential of the stock (Diekert et al. 2010; 
Hannesson 1993).  
 
3.1.2 Number of Individuals 
In accordance with traditional Beverton-Holt modeling (see e.g. Beverton & Holt 1957), the 
number of individuals in age group a+1 in period t+1 (Na+1, t+1) is modeled as a function of the 
number of individuals in age group a in period t (Na,t), the natural mortality for age group a in 
period t (Ma,t) and the total fishing mortality for age group a in period t (Fa, t): 
(1) 𝑵𝒂+𝟏,𝒕+𝟏 = 𝑵𝒂,𝒕 ∗  𝒆
−(𝑴𝒂,𝒕+𝑭𝒂,𝒕), (𝟒 ≤ 𝒂 ≤ 𝟏𝟐)  
(2) 𝑵𝟏𝟑,𝒕+𝟏 = 𝑵𝟏𝟑,𝒕 ∗ 𝒆
−(𝑴𝟏𝟑+𝑭𝟏𝟑,𝒕) + 𝑵𝟏𝟐,𝒕 ∗ 𝒆
−(𝑴𝟏𝟐+𝑭𝟏𝟐,𝒕) 
The number of individuals in age group 3 in period t is determined by the recruitment in 




3.1.3 Natural Mortality 
As mentioned, the NEA cod is cannibalistic – older individuals are inclined to feed on younger 
individuals, especially when the availability of other sources of food is scarce. The natural 
mortality due to cannibalism may be significant for younger age groups and should thus be 
modeled (Kovalev & Bogstad 2005; Yaragina et al. 2009).  
It seems reasonable that an increase in the number of sexually mature individuals will lead to 
an increase in cannibalistic behavior due to an increase in the pressure on the ecosystem and an 
increase in the competition for food, i.e. a reduction in the availability of food per individual. 
The natural mortality for age group a in period t (Ma,t) for the age groups 3, 4 and 5 have 
therefore been modeled as functions of the number of sexually mature individuals.  
The sum of sexually mature individuals in each age group a in period t (Kt) is modeled as a 
function of the sexual maturity parameters for the different age groups (ka), which are assumed 
to be constant for all age groups (see table 1)8, and the number of individuals in each age group 
in period t (Na,t):  
(3) 𝑲𝒕 = ∑ 𝑵𝒂,𝒕 ∗ 𝒌𝒂
𝟏𝟑+
𝒂=𝟑  
Table 1: Numerical specification of the sexual maturity parameters 








ka 0 0.003 0.050 0.274 0.578 0.810 0.937 0.985 0.995 0.997 1 
 
The natural mortality for the age groups 3 and 4 are modeled as concave functions of the number 
of sexually mature individuals in period t-1 (Kt-1)
9:  






, (𝟑 ≤ 𝒂 ≤ 𝟒) 
                                                          
8 The numerical specification of the sexual maturity parameters is based on data from ICES (2018). Average values 
for the period 2000-2018 have been calculated and applied to the model.  
9 From an isolated perspective, it would be natural to model the natural mortality for the age groups 3, 4 and 5 in 
period t as functions of the number of sexually mature individuals in period t (Kt) or the spawning stock biomass 
in period t (SSBt). However, such an approach would have produced a circular reference in the model. K t-1 has 
been used instead of Kt to avoid circular referencing and approximate the natural way of modeling the relationship. 
Although inaccurate, the approach can be justified to a large extent. In most simulation scenarios, there will be a 
strong correlation between Kt-1 and Kt. When studying steady state situations, Kt-1 = Kt  as long as the steady state 
situation was entered in period t-1 or earlier, and the approach will therefore not produce any bias in such cases. 
However, it is important to pay attention to the bias the approach produces when studying cyclical fishing patterns 





𝑀 are coefficients estimated by log-log regressions on ICES data with the 
number of sexually mature individuals measured in thousands (see table 2)10.  
The natural mortality for age group 5 in period t (M5,t) is modeled as a linear function of the 
number of sexually mature individuals in period t-1 (Kt-1) as this gave a better fit than the 
functional form used for age class 3 and 4: 





𝑀 are coefficients estimated by linear regression on ICES data with the number 
of sexually mature individuals measured in thousands (see table 2).  
Table 2: Numerical specification of parameters in the natural mortality functions for age class 3, 4 and 5 (equation 
4 and 5), and corresponding p-values and coefficients of determination 
Age group 𝜶𝒂
𝑴 𝜶𝒂
𝑴: p > |t| 𝜷𝒂
𝑴 𝜷𝒂
𝑴: p > |t| R^2 
3 -4.136 0.000 0.239 0.001 0.304 
4 -3.141 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.383 
5 0.212 0.000 2.33e-08 0.283 0.036 
 
The natural mortality (Ma,t) for the age groups 6-13+ are assumed to be constant and 
conventionally set to 0.2, in accordance with ICES data (ICES 2018).  
 
3.1.4 Fishing Mortality 
As mentioned, the fleet structure in the model is three folded. Fleet 1 is Norwegian trawlers. 
Fleet 2 is Norwegian conventional vessels. Fleet 3 is Russian and third countries’ trawlers. The 
total fishing mortality for age group a in period t (Fa,t) depends on the effort applied by each 
fleet i = 1, 2, 3 in period t (E1, t, E2, t, E3, t) and the fleets’ catchability coefficients for age group 
a (q1, a, q2, a, q3, a). The effort units are defined as operating days and serve as control variables in 
the model. The catchability coefficients measure the gear selectivity of the different fleets, and 
the numerical specification of these will be accounted for in sub-section 3.2. The total fishing 
mortality for age group a in period t is modeled as follows:  
(6) 𝑭𝒂,𝒕 = 𝒒𝟏,𝒂,𝒕𝑬𝟏,,𝒕 + 𝒒𝟐,𝒂,𝒕𝑬𝟐,𝒕 + 𝒒𝟑,𝒂,𝒕𝑬𝟑,𝒕.  
                                                          
10 The estimators 𝛼𝑎
𝑊 and 𝛽𝑎
𝑊 for age class 3 and 4 are estimated by log-log regressions in STATA with data from 
ICES (2018). Data for the period 1984-2017 has been used. The estimators 𝛼5
𝑀 and 𝛽5
𝑀 are estimated by linear 
regression in STATA with the same data. 
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3.1.5 Total Stock Biomass 
The biomass in each age group a in period t (ba,t) is modeled as a function of the number of 
individuals in age group a in period t (Na,t) and the average weight for individuals in age 
group a in period t (Wa,t): 
(7) 𝒃𝒂,𝒕 = 𝑵𝒂,𝒕 ∗ 𝑾𝒂,𝒕 
It seems reasonable that an increase in the number of sexually mature individuals will lead to a 
reduction in the average weight for most age groups due to an increase in the pressure on the 
ecosystem and an increase in the competition for food, i.e. reduced availability of food per 
individual. Analyzing ICES data, it seems that this is the case for age groups 5-11. The average 
weight for individuals in age group a in period t (Wa,t) has therefore been made endogenous for 
age groups 5-11, and are modeled as functions of the number of sexually mature individuals in 
period t (Kt) (Equation 8). Kovalev and Bogstad (2005) apply a similar approach when 
modeling weight at age.  






, (𝟓 ≤ 𝒂 ≤ 𝟏𝟏) 
where 𝛼𝑎
𝑊 and 𝛽𝑎
𝑊 are coefficients estimated by log-log regressions on ICES data with weight 
measured in kilograms (kg) and the number of sexually mature individuals measured in 
thousands (see table 3)11.  
Table 3: Numerical specification of parameters in the weight at age functions (equation 8), and corresponding p-
values and coefficients of determination 
Age group 𝜶𝒂
𝑾 𝜶𝒂
𝑾: p > |t| 𝜷𝒂
𝑾 𝜷𝒂
𝑾: p > |t| R^2 
5 1.439 0.009 -0.101 0.025 0.144 
6 1.946 0.000 -0.010 0.003 0.241 
7 2.424 0.000 -0.104 0.000 0.340 
8 2.562 0.000 -0.085 0.002 0.260 
9 2.617 0.000 -0.062 0.033 0.130 
10 2.832 0.000 -0.055 0.117 0.073 
11 3.078 0.000 -0.060 0.089 0.085 
 
                                                          
11 The estimators 𝛼𝑎
𝑊 and 𝛽𝑎
𝑊 for age class 5-11 are estimated by log-log regressions in STATA with data from 
ICES (2018). Data for the period 1983-2017 has been used. 
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The average weights for the age groups 3, 4. 12 and 13+ are assumed to be constant and set to 
0.274 kg, 0.66 kg, 12.67 kg and 14.27 kg, respectively. The values are average values calculated 
with data for the period 1983-2017 from ICES (2018).  
The total biomass of the stock in period t (Bt) is the sum of the biomass in each age group a in 
period t (ba,t): 




3.1.6 Total Spawning Stock Biomass and Recruitment 
The total spawning stock biomass in period t (SSBt) is the sum of the number of sexually mature 
individuals in each age group a in period t (Na,t*ka) multiplied by the average weight of 
individuals in each age group a in period t (Wa,t):  
(10) 𝑺𝑺𝑩𝒕 = ∑ 𝑵𝒂,𝒕 ∗ 𝒌𝒂 ∗ 𝑾𝒂,𝒕
𝟏𝟑+
𝒂=𝟑  
In real life, recruitment appears to be somewhat stochastic. However, if there are no fish, there 
will be no eggs, and with no eggs, there will be no recruitment. Furthermore, it seems reasonable 
that there is some sort of positive diminishing relationship between the size of the spawning 
stock biomass and future recruitment since the NEA cod is cannibalistic. For simplicity, and to 
encompass this, the recruitment to the stock is modeled by a Beverton-Holt recruitment 
function. Since recruitment happens when the fish reaches the age of 3, the recruitment in period 





where 𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐵 and 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝐵 are coefficients estimated using a least squares method on ICES data with 
recruitment measured in thousands and SSB measured in tons12. 𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐵 is estimated to 725 526 
and 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝐵 is estimated to 128 392. The corresponding R^2 is calculated to 0.44.  
 
3.2 Harvest Functions 
The harvest measured in number of individuals for each fleet and from each age group in period 
t (yi,a,t) is determined by the fleets’ harvest functions. Fleet i’s harvest from age group a depends 
                                                          
12 The parameters 𝛼𝑆𝑆𝐵 and 𝛽𝑆𝑆𝐵 are estimated using a least squares method in MS Excel with data from ICES 
(2018). Data for the period 1980-2018 has been used. 
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on the effort applied by all fleets in period t (E1, t, E2, t, E3, t), the fleets’ catchability coefficients 
for age group a (q1, a, q2, a, q3, a), the natural mortality for age group a in period t (Ma, t) and the 
number of individuals in age group a in period t (Na,t). A Baranov type of harvest function has 
been used (see e.g. Baranov 1918)13.  The harvest function for fleet 1 for age class a is 
formulated in equation 12. Symmetrical harvest functions are formulated for fleet 2 and fleet 3.  
(12) 𝒚𝟏,𝒂,𝒕 = (
𝒒𝟏,𝒂,𝒕𝑬𝟏,,𝒕
𝒒𝟏,𝒂,𝒕𝑬𝟏,𝒕+𝒒𝟐,𝒂,𝒕𝑬𝟐,𝒕+𝒒𝟑,𝒂,𝒕𝑬𝟑,𝒕+𝑴𝒂,𝒕
) 𝑵𝒂,𝒕(𝟏 − 𝒆
−(𝒒𝟏,𝒂,𝒕𝑬𝟏,𝒕+𝒒𝟐,𝒂,𝒕𝑬𝟐,𝒕+𝒒𝟑,𝒂,𝒕𝑬𝟑,𝒕+𝑴𝒂,𝒕)) 
The catchability coefficients (qi, a) are estimated using a least squares method on data from 
ICES, IMR and the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries with effort measured in operating days, 
and harvest and the number of individuals measured in thousands (see table 4 and figure 2)14.  
Table 4: Numerical specification of the catchability coefficients in the harvest functions (q1,a, q2,a, q3,a) and 
corresponding coefficients of determination for each fleet (R1^2, R2^2, R3^2) and the entire fishery (Rtotal^2) 




































































R1^2 -0.12 0.60 -0.52 0.90 0.87 0.80 0.55 0.89 0.50 0.41 -0.60 
R2^2 -0.21 0.29 0.89 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.79 0.96 0.98 0.91 0.78 
R3^2 0.76 0.98 0.76 0.83 0.60 0.76 0.78 0.56 0.75 -2.55 -3.88 
Rtotal^2 0.57 0.96 0.74 0.83 0.66 0.78 0.75 0.85 0.73 0.55 0.51 
                                                          
13 The Baranov Catch equation is often used in quantitative fisheries science. However, and although it may serve 
as a good approximation of more realistic catch equations, it may lead to a wrong understanding of seasonal 
fisheries dynamics (Liu & Heino 2013). See Diekert et al. (2010) for a more realistic modeling approach for this 
fishery.  
14 The catchability coefficients are estimated using a least squares method in MS Excel with data from ICES 
(2018), data received from IMR (which can be found in the appendix), and data from ICES (2018). I have used 
data for the period 2011-2015. Data on effort for the Norwegian coastal fleet has been used to represent the effort 
for the Norwegian conventional fleet. Data on effort for the Norwegian ocean-going fleet has been used to 
represent the effort for the Norwegian trawler fleet. This approximation involves some inaccuracy because the 
Norwegian ocean-going fleet includes conventional ocean-going vessels, which is part of the Norwegian 
conventional fleet in the model. The effort for other countries are estimated based on the assumption that the effort 





𝐵 ), where 𝑦1,𝑡
𝐵  is Norwegian trawlers’ harvest measured in biomass in period t and 𝑦3,𝑡
𝐵  is other countries’ 
trawlers’ harvest measured in biomass in period t. The Norwegian trawler fleet’s catchability coefficient for age 





Figure 2: The fleets’ gear selectivity. Numerical specification of catchability coefficients on y-axis. Age group at 
x-axis. q_Nor trawl = Norwegian trawler fleet, q_Nor conv =Norwegian conventional fleet and q_Other countries 
= Russian and third countries’ trawlers. 
 
Fleet i’s total harvest measured in biomass in period t (yBi, t) is modeled as the sum of fleet i’s 
harvest measured in number of individuals from each age group a in period t (yi, a, t) multiplied 
by the average weight of individuals in each age group a in period t (Wa, t): 
(13) 𝒚𝒊,𝒕
𝑩 = ∑ 𝒚𝒊,𝒂,𝒕 ∗ 𝑾𝒂,𝒕
𝟏𝟑+
𝒂=𝟑  
The total harvest measured in biomass for all fleets in period t (YBt) is the sum of the total catch 
measured in biomass for each fleet in period t (yBi, t): 
(14) 𝒀𝒕




3.3 The Economic Sub-Model 
3.3.1 Revenue 
There are two revenue functions in the model, one for the Norwegian conventional fleet and 
one for the Norwegian trawler fleet. The revenue for fleet i in period t (Ii, t) depends on how 
much fleet i harvest in period t (𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝐵 ) and the average price faced by the fleets in period t (Pt): 
(15) 𝑰𝒊,𝒕 = 𝒚𝒊,𝒕
𝑩 ∗ 𝑷𝒕  
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In many age-structured models, the prices are indexed by age because larger fish tend to have 
a higher price/kg than smaller fish. Zimmermann et al. (2011) show that positively size-
dependent pricing shifts optimal harvesting strategies towards lower harvest rates and higher 
mean body size of caught fish. However, the reality of the prices and price dynamics in the 
NEA cod fishery is way more complex than this, and although the Norwegian trawler fleet 
harvest more small fish relative to large fish when compared to the Norwegian conventional 
fleet, the Norwegian trawler fleet has experienced higher average prices/kg than the Norwegian 
conventional fleet multiple years (Fiskeridirektoratet 2009-2018). This can likely be explained 
by differences in the intra-yearly seasonal fishing pattern and differences in the fish products 
that are delivered and sold by the vessel groups. To achieve a more realistic picture of the price 
dynamics and avoid giving the Norwegian conventional fleet a potentially undeserved 
advantage, it is assumed that both fleets face the same average price in period t (Pt). The average 
price in period t (Pt) is modeled as a function of the historical average price (Pavg), the total 
harvest (YBt) relative to the historical average total harvest (Y
B
avg) and a price elasticity (p):  







The historical average price per kg (Pavg) is calculated with data from the Norwegian Directorate 
of Fisheries and Norges Bank. The historical average total harvest (YBavg) is calculated with 
ICES data. The price elasticity (p) is roughly estimated by log-log regression on the same data 
that was used to calculate Pavg and Y
B
avg. The parameter values are presented in table 5
15.  
Table 5: Numerical specification of the parameters in the price function 
Parameter Parameter value 
Pavg 11.8 NOK/kg 




                                                          
15 The numerical specification of Pavg and  YBavg are based on data from Fiskeridirektoratet (2009-2018), the 
Norwegian central bank (to adjust for inflation) and ICES (2018). Average values from the period 2009-2016 have 




There are two cost functions in the model, one for Norwegian conventional vessels and one for 
Norwegian trawlers. The total costs for each fleet in period t (TCi,t) depends on the number of 
vessels in operation in fleet i in period t (
𝑬𝒊,𝒕
𝑬𝒊,𝒂𝒗𝒈
 ), the average unit cost related to operating a 
vessel in fleet i (CDi), the total effort applied by fleet i in period t (Ei,t), the average unit cost 
related to applying effort for fleet i (CEi), the revenue for fleet i in period t (Ii,t) and the share of 





𝑫 + 𝑬𝒊,𝒕 ∗ 𝑪𝒊
𝑬 + 𝑰𝒊,𝒕 ∗ 𝑪𝒊
𝑳.  
The average effort applied by fleet i per year (𝐸𝑖,𝑎𝑣𝑔) is calculated with data from the Norwegian 
Directorate of fisheries. The cost parameters are estimated with data from the Norwegian 
Directorate of fisheries and data from the Norwegian central bank. The parameter values are 
presented in table 616.  





The profit for fleet i in period t (𝜋𝑖,𝑡) equals the revenue for fleet i in period t (Ii, t) minus the 
total costs for fleet i in period t (TCi, t):  
                                                          
16 The numerical specification of the cost parameters is based on data from Fiskeridirektoratet (2009-2018) and 
the Norwegian central bank (to adjust for inflation). Data for the period 2009-2016 has been used. Costs related to 
depreciation and normal taxes have been excluded. The costs have then been adjusted for inflation and categorized 
according to the cost structure in the model. All costs have been measured in 2016 NOK. To estimate CDi and CEi, 
average values for the period has been calculated by categorization and multiplied by a factor equal to the average 
share of revenue that was generated by the harvest of cod in the period 2009-2016. CLi has been estimated by 
calculating the average of the yearly share of total revenue that was used to pay crew and fees in fleet i.  
Parameter Parameter 
value 
C1D 4 696 213 NOK 
C2D 528 189 NOK 
C1E 12 473 NOK 
C2E 1118 NOK 
C1L 0.354 
C2L 0.46 
E1, avg 305 
E2, avg 155 
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(18) 𝝅𝒊,𝒕 = 𝑰𝒊,𝒕 − 𝑻𝑪𝒊,𝒕 
The total profit for the Norwegian part of the fishery in period t (𝜋𝑡) is formulated as: 
(19) 𝝅𝒕 = 𝝅𝟏,𝒕 + 𝝅𝟐,𝒕 
 
3.3.4 Net Present Value  
The NPV of the Norwegian part of the fishery is defined as the sum of discounted profits for 
the Norwegian part of the fishery and depends on the discount factor (𝛿), the total profit for the 
Norwegian part of the fishery in period t (𝜋𝑡) and the time horizon of the model (T).  
(20) 𝑵𝑷𝑽 = ∑ 𝜹𝒕𝝅𝒕
𝑻
𝒕=𝟎  
The discount rate is set to 5%, which implies a discount factor (𝛿) of 0.9523. And the model is 
solved for T=65 years. The choice of a long time horizon is motivated by my focus on steady-
state scenarios.  
 
3.3 Initialization of the Model 
The model is initialized with somewhat arbitrary, but reasonable values for Na, t=0, Ma, t=0, 
SSBt=0-2 and SSBt=0-1. These values are needed to start the model.  
  
4 Simulations 
The prospective biological and economic gain/loss from applying different management 
strategies will be illustrated by scenarios in which a hypothetical sole owner chooses effort 
levels to maximize either total harvest in period t=65 (Equation 14) or the net present value of 
the Norwegian part of the fishery for the model period (Equation 20), subject to different 
constraints.  
The constraints implied by the fish stock dynamics (equations 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 11, and the 
model initialization values) apply to all scenarios. Other constraints are scenario-specific and 
concern whether effort can vary between years and the distribution of the total harvest in terms 
of shares. When studying the concepts of MSY and MEY, which involve steady-state fishing, 
effort is not allowed to vary between years, i.e. 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1for all fleets i=1, 2, 3 and all periods 
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t=0, 1, …, 65. Since the model is deterministic, applying the same effort each year allows rapid 
convergence to steady-state. When studying the concept of MNPV, which may involve 
strategies such as pulse fishing, effort may vary between years. Table 7 provides an overview 
of simulated scenarios. The MS Excel Solver add-in and its GRG nonlinear solver has been 
used to solve the optimization problems. All simulations have been conducted several times 
with different initialization values. In steady-state simulations, the a final run is simulated with 
the model initialized at previously reported steady-state levels. This is done to ensure optimum 
results.  
Table 7: An overview of simulated scenarios/solved optimization problems  




distribution of TAC 
Distribution of 
Norwegian share of 
TAC 








MSY_NQNT MSY No Today’s international 
distribution 
Entire share to 
Fleet 1 (Nor conv) 




MSY_NT MSY No Entire share to the 
Norwegian part of the 
fishery 
Entire share to 
Fleet 1 (Nor trawl) 
MSY_OCT MSY No Entire share to 
Fleet 3 (Foreign trawl) 
- 








MEY_NQNC MEY No Today’s international 
distribution 
Entire share to 
Fleet 2 (Nor conv) 




MEY_NT MEY No Entire share to the 
Norwegian part of the 
fishery 
Entire share to 
Fleet 1 (Nor trawl) 








MNPV_NT Maximize NPV Yes Entire share to the 
Norwegian part of the 
fishery 
Entire share to 
Fleet 1 (Nor trawl) 
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5 Results and Discussion 
The main results from the simulation scenarios presented in table 6 are shown in table 7. In the 
following, I will account for the results and discuss their implications. In addition, I will provide 
a sensitivity analysis.  
Table 8: Main results from simulated scenarios/solved optimization problems  
* No economic details have been modeled for fleet 3. The economic results must be interpreted accordingly.  
** Cyclical fishing pattern. Average values over the cycles are reported.   
 
5.1 Maximum Sustainable Yield 
5.1.1 Today’s Management Scenario 
Today’s management scenario is simulated by maximizing the sustainable biological yield 
subject to today’s international and national allocation of the TAC in terms of shares. The yearly 
harvest is estimated at 658 thousand tons in steady-state. This estimate is in the range of MSY-
estimates provided by Kovalev and Bogstad (2005). The associated SSB is estimated at 1.65 
million tons. The associated economic yield is estimated at 262 million NOK. Fleet 1 and Fleet 
2’s profit margins are both estimated at about 7.1%. However, the profit margin of Fleet 1 is 
slightly higher than the profit margin of Fleet 2. The associated NPV is calculated to 5.27 billion 
NOK.  
 
5.1.2 MSY with Optimal Allocation of the Norwegian Share of the TAC  
MSY_NQMB denotes the scenario in which today’s management strategy concerning the 
determination and international allocation of the total quota is maintained, while the allocation 
of the Norwegian share of the total quota is determined endogenously. It is simulated by 








NPV         
(billion NOK)*
Today's management 1 (15%), 2 (30%), 3 (55%) 659 1 652 262 5
MSY_NQMB 2 (45%), 3 (55%) 675 1 697 281 6
MSY_NQNT 1 (45%), 3 (55%) 624 1 605 199 4
MSY_MB 2 (100%) 793 2 587 2 125 43
MSY_NT 1 (100%) 692 2 172 1 685 34
MSY_OCT 3 (100%) 564 1 264 - -
MEY_CQP 1 (15%), 2 (30%), 3 (55%) 551 3 846 1 259 25
MEY_NQMB 1 (45%) and 3 (55%) 502 4 145 1 266 25
MEY_NQNC 2 (45%) and 3 (55%) 575 3 720 1 257 25
MEY_MB 2 (100%) 701 4 397 3 351 67
MEY_NT 1 (100%) 583 4 445 3 211 65
MNPV_ NQMB 1 (12%), 2 (33%), 3 (55%)** 538** 4037** 1272** 26
MNPV_MB 2 (100%) 699 4 408 3 351 67
MNPV_NT 1 (100%) 581 4 455 3 211 65
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maximizing the sustainable yield with respect to effort subject to today’s international 
allocation of the total quota in terms of shares. The results show that it is optimal, both from a 
biological and economic perspective, and under the given conditions, to allocate the entire 
Norwegian share of the total quota to Fleet 2. The yearly harvest is estimated at 675 thousand 
tons with an associated SSB at 1.7 million tons – an increase of about 2.6% and 3%, 
respectively, from today’s management scenario – a significant increase considering only 15% 
of the TAC is reallocated. The associated sustainable economic yield is estimated at 281 million 
NOK – an increase of about 7.3% from today's management scenario. Fleet 2’s profit margin 
is estimated at 7.5% - slightly higher than the overall profit margin in today’s management 
scenario. The NPV is calculated to 5.66 billion NOK.  
Considering the fleets’ selection pattern and the findings in earlier research (see figure 2, section 
1.3 and section 2 for a reminder), the biological results are unsurprising. Fleet 2 targets more 
old cod relative to young cod than Fleet 1. In line with earlier research, I find that an increase 
in the utilization of Fleet 2 at the expense of the utilization of Fleet 1 leads to an increase in the 
realization of the growth potential of the stock – more young cod grows into becoming old cod 
before it is harvested, and this results in a higher sustainable yield and SSB.  
It is interesting that, although Fleet 1’s profit margin is higher than Fleet 2’s profit margin in 
today’s management scenario, it is optimal, not only from a biological perspective, but also 
from an economic perspective, and under the given conditions, to allocate the entire Norwegian 
share of the total quota to Fleet 2. It is, however, logical. It can be partly explained by the 
increase in the realization of the growth potential of the stock. In addition, there is another 
mechanism that also plays an important role. When fewer young cod is caught, more cod grows 
into becoming old cod, and this gives a higher harvest per unit effort (see equation 11) which 
in turn gives lower harvest costs per kg. This positive effect outweighs the negative effect that 
the increase in harvest has on the average price (see equation 15) and results in a higher profit 
for the Norwegian part of the fishery.  
MSY_NQNT denotes the scenario in which today’s management strategy concerning the 
determination and international allocation of the total quota is maintained, while the entire 
Norwegian share of the total quota is allocated to Fleet 1. It is simulated by maximizing the 
sustainable biological yield with respect to effort subject to today’s international allocation of 
the total quota and a constraint that hinders the use of Fleet 2. This simulation is done to 
highlight the negative effect that the utilization of Fleet 1 at the expense of the utilization of 
Fleet 2, has on the realization of the stock’s growth potential. The yearly harvest is estimated 
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at 624 thousand tons with an associated SSB at 1.6 million tons – a decrease of about 7.6% and 
5.9%, respectively, from the MSY_NQMB scenario. The associated economic yield is estimated 
at 199 million NOK, a decrease of about 29.2% from the MSY_NQMB scenario. Fleet 1’s profit 
margin is estimated at 5.6% - 1.9% less than Fleet 2 in the MSY_NQMB scenario. The NPV is 
calculated to 4 billion NOK.  
 
5.1.3 MSY with Optimal Allocation of the TAC 
MSY_MB denotes the scenario in which today’s management strategy concerning the 
determination of the total quota is maintained, while the international and national allocation of 
the total quota is determined endogenously. It is simulated by maximizing the sustainable 
biological yield with respect to effort subject to no constraints concerning the allocation of the 
total quota. In line with the results from section 5.1.2, the results show that it is optimal, both 
from a biological and economic perspective and under the given conditions, to allocate the 
entire total quota to Fleet 2. The yearly harvest is estimated at 793 thousand tons with an 
associated SSB at 2.59 million tons – an increase of about 20.5% and 57%, respectively, from 
today’s management scenario. The associated economic yield is estimated at 2.12 billion NOK. 
This result is not directly comparable with results from simulations where Fleet 3 gets 55% of 
the total quota since no economic details have been described for this fleet. However, by 
assuming that the Norwegian part of the fishery get 45% of the yearly profits, while Russia and 
third countries get 55% of yearly profits, the result can be made comparable with results from 
simulations where Fleet 3 gets 55% of the total quota. By applying this assumption, the 
associated economic yield is estimated at 954 million NOK – an increase of 692 million NOK 
from today’s management scenario. Fleet 2’s profit margin is estimated at 22.8% - significantly 
higher than the profit margins in today’s management scenario. The associated NPV is 
calculated to 19.23 billion NOK. The drivers behind the results are the same as those explained 
in section 5.1.2.  
MSY_NT and MSY_OCT denote the scenarios in which today’s management strategy 
concerning the determination of the total quota is maintained, while the entire total quota is 
allocated to Fleet 1 and Fleet 3, respectively. These simulations are done to highlight the 
differences between the fleets’ selection patterns/ability to realize the stock’s growth potential. 
The results highlight the fact that Fleet 3 has a highly inefficient selection pattern when 
compared to Fleet 1 and Fleet 2. To be able to defend the utilization of Fleet 3 from an economic 
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sole owner perspective, the harvesting costs per kg experienced by Fleet 3 must be significantly 
lower than the harvesting costs per kg experienced by Fleet 1 and Fleet 2.  
 
5.2 Maximum Economic Yield 
5.2.1 MEY with Today’s Allocation of the TAC 
MEY_CQP denotes the scenario in which today’s management strategy concerning the 
international and national allocation of the total quota is maintained, while the strategy 
concerning the determination of the total quota is changed to maximize the sustainable 
economic yield. It is simulated by maximizing the sustainable economic yield with respect to 
effort subject to today’s international and national allocation of the total quota in terms of 
shares. The sustainable yield is estimated at 551 thousand tons with an associated SSB at 3.84 
million tons – a decrease of 16.3% and an increase of 132%, respectively, from today’s 
management scenario. The sustainable economic yield is estimated at 1.26 billion NOK – an 
increase of about 1 billion NOK from today’s management scenario. Fleet 1’s profit margin is 
estimated at 42.7%, while fleet 2’s profit margin is estimated at 40.7% - much higher than the 
profit margins in today’s management scenario. The associated NPV is calculated to 25.3 
billion NOK. The main drivers behind the results are the positive effect that an increase in the 
number of individuals in the different age groups has on harvest per unit effort and the positive 
effect that a reduction in the overall harvest has on the average price. These positive effects 
outweigh the negative effect of lower yearly harvest.  
 
5.2.2 MEY with Optimal Allocation of the Norwegian Share of the TAC 
MEY_NQMB denotes the scenario in which today’s management strategy concerning the 
international allocation of the total quota is maintained, while the strategy concerning the 
determination of the total quota is to maximize the sustainable economic yield, and the 
allocation of the Norwegian share of the total quota is determined endogenously. It is simulated 
by maximizing the sustainable economic yield with respect to effort subject to today’s 
international allocation of the total quota in terms of shares. The results show that it is optimal, 
from an economic perspective and under the given conditions, to allocate the entire Norwegian 
share of the total quota to Fleet 1. The yearly harvest is estimated at 502 thousand tons with an 
associated SSB at 4.1 million tons – a reduction of 8.9% and an increase of 6.7%, respectively, 
from the MEY_CQP scenario. The sustainable economic yield is estimated at 1.27 billion NOK 
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– almost the same as in the MEY_CQP scenario. In other words, there is little to gain in 
economic terms by changing the allocation of the Norwegian share of the total quota in terms 
of shares. Fleet 1’s profit margin is estimated at 44% - about 1.3% higher than Fleet 1’s profit 
in the MEY_CQP scenario. The NPV is calculated to 25.47 billion NOK.  
MEY_NQNC denotes the scenario in which today’s management strategy concerning the 
international allocation of the total quota is maintained, while the strategy concerning the 
determination is changed, and the entire Norwegian share of the total quota is allocated to Fleet 
2. It is simulated by maximizing the sustainable economic yield with respect to effort subject 
to today’s international allocation of the total quota and a constraint that hinders the use of Fleet 
1. The yearly harvest is estimated at 575 thousand tons with an associated SSB at 3.7 million 
tons. When compared to the MEY_NQMB scenario, this corresponds to an increase of 14.2% 
in yearly harvest and a decrease of 9.8% in the SSB. The sustainable economic yield is 
estimated at 1.26 billion NOK – the same as in the MEY_CQP scenario, and slightly lower than 
in the MEY_NQMB scenario. The last result shows that the allocation of the Norwegian share 
of the total quota is not so important, seen from an economic perspective, when the goal is to 
maximize the sustainable economic yield under the given conditions. Fleet 2’s profit margin is 
estimated at 40% - slightly lower than Fleet 2’s profit margin in the MEY_CQP scenario, and 
4% lower than Fleet 1’s profit margin in the MEY_NQMB scenario. The NPV is calculated to 
25.3 billion NOK.  
The biological results from the MEY_NQMB and MEY_NQNC are key to understanding why 
it proves to be optimal to allocate the entire Norwegian share of the total quota to Fleet 1 when 
the goal is to maximize the sustainable economic yield under the given conditions. The result 
might appear surprising to some considering the MSY_CQP, MSY_NQMB and MSY_NQNC 
results. However, it is logical and easily explained. The yearly harvest in the MEY_NQMB 
scenario is significantly lower than in the MEY_NQNC scenario, hence the average price per 
kg of fish is higher. Furthermore, the SSB is higher, which is a result from a lower fishing 
pressure that gives a higher number of individuals in several age groups in steady-state, and this 
gives a higher harvest per unit effort which induces lower harvest costs per kg. Addressing the 
last effect and comparing the MSY_NQNC scenario with the MSY_CQP and MSY_NQMB 
scenario, the opposite was the case. The SSB and the number of individuals in several age 
groups were lower in the scenario where only fleet 1 and fleet 3 were utilized (MSY_NQNC) 
when compared to the other two scenarios (MSY_CQP and MSY_NQMB). As a result, Fleet 1 
experienced higher harvest costs per kg in the MSY_NQNC scenario when compared to the 
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MSY_CQP scenario. The sum of the two positive effects outweighs the negative effect of a 
lower yearly harvest and explain why it is optimal to allocate the entire Norwegian share of the 
total quota to Fleet 1 under the given conditions in the MEY_NQMB scenario – although it is 
by slight margins.  
 
5.2.3 MEY with Optimal Allocation of the TAC 
MEY_MB denotes the scenario in which the strategy concerning the determination of the total 
quota is to maximize the sustainable economic yield and the allocation of the total quota is 
determined endogenously. It is simulated by maximizing the sustainable economic yield with 
no constraints concerning the allocation of the total quota. The results show that it is optimal, 
from an economic perspective, to allocate the entire total quota to Fleet 2. The yearly harvest is 
estimated at 701 thousand tons with an associated SSB at 4.4 million tons. The sustainable 
economic yield is estimated at 3.35 billion NOK. As earlier, it is assumed that the Norwegian 
part of the fishery gets 45% of these profits since Fleet 3 doesn’t participate. By applying the 
assumption, the sustainable economic yield is estimated at 1.5 billion NOK – an increase of 240 
million from the MEY_CQP scenario. The associated NPV is calculated to 30.38 billion NOK.  
MEY_NT denotes the scenario in which the strategy concerning the determination of the total 
quota is to maximize the sustainable economic yield and the entire total quota is allocated to 
Fleet 1. It is simulated by maximizing the sustainable economic yield subject to a constraint 
that hinders the utilization of Fleet 2. Since no economic details are described for Fleet 3, it is 
not necessary to apply a constraint that hinders the utilization of this fleet – it is automatically 
left out of the competition. The yearly harvest is estimated at 583 thousand tons with an 
associated SSB at 4.44 million tons. Compared to the MEY_MB scenario, this corresponds to 
a decrease of 28.9% in yearly harvest and a relatively small increase of less than 1% in the SSB. 
The economic yield is estimated at 3.21 billion NOK. Assuming the Norwegian part of the 
fishery gets 45% of these profits, the sustainable economic yield is estimated at 1.44 billion 
NOK – a decrease of 60 million when compared to MEY_MB scenario. The associated NPV is 
calculated to 29.05 billion NOK.  
In the MEY_NQMB scenario, it proved to be optimal to allocate the entire Norwegian share of 
the total quota to Fleet 1. In this scenario, Fleet 3 was also participating, harvesting 55% of the 
yearly total harvest. In the MEY_MB scenario, Fleet 3 is not participating, and this is the reason  
why it is optimal to utilize only Fleet 2. When Fleet 3 does not participate, more of the stock’s 
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growth potential can be realized, and this is the main explanation to why it is optimal to utilize 
only Fleet 2 under the given conditions in the MEY_MB scenario.  
 
5.3 Maximum Net Present Value 
5.3.1 MNPV with Optimal Allocation of the Norwegian Share of the TAC 
 
 
Figure 3: MNPVNQMB results (Left: Effort over the model period. Middle: Harvest by fleet over the model period. 
Right: total stock biomass (TSB), SSB and Total harvest over the model period) 
MNPV_NQMB denotes the scenario in which the strategy concerning the international 
allocation of the total quota is maintained, while the strategy concerning the determination of 
the total quota is changed to maximize the net present value of the Norwegian part of the fishery. 
It is simulated by maximizing the net present value of the Norwegian part of the fishery with 
respect to effort subject to today’s international allocation of the total quota in terms of shares. 
The results show that is optimal to apply a cyclical fishing pattern with alternation between 
intense harvesting and less intense harvesting with stock recovery (see figure 3). Furthermore, 
the results show that it is optimal to make use of Fleet 1 in periods with relatively low harvest 
and make use of Fleet 2 in periods with relatively high harvest. The average yearly harvest is 
estimated at 538 thousand tons with the SSB averaging at 4 million tons – a decrease of about 
2.4% and an increase of about 4.1%, respectively, from the MEY_CQP scenario. The average 
yearly economic yield is estimated at 1.27 billion NOK – about the same as in the MEY_NQMB 
scenario. The associated NPV is calculated at 25.58 billion NOK. In other words, and compared 
to the MEY_NQMB scenario, there is not much to gain in economic terms by applying a 





5.3.2 MNPV with Optimal Allocation of the TAC 
 
 
Figure 4: MNPVMB results (Left: Effort over the  model period. Middle: Harvest by fleet over the model period. 
Right: total stock biomass (TSB), SSB and Total harvest over the model period) 
MNPV_MB denotes the scenario in which the objective is to maximize the net present value of 
the Norwegian part of the fishery with the international and national allocation of the total quota 
determined endogenously. It is simulated by maximizing the net present value of the Norwegian 
part of the fishery with effort being allowed to vary between years subject to no constraints 
concerning the allocation of the total quota. The results are in line with the MEY_MB results 
(see figure 4). 
 
Figure 5: MNPVNT results (Left: Effort over the model period. Middle: Harvest by fleet over the model period. 
Right: total stock biomass (TSB), SSB and Total harvest over the model period) 
MNPV_NT denotes the scenario in which the objective is to maximize the net present value of 
the Norwegian part of the fishery with the entire total quota allocated to Fleet 1. It is simulated 
by maximizing the net present value of the Norwegian part of the fishery with effort being 
allowed to vary between years subject to a constraint that hinders the use of Fleet 2. The results 
are in line with the MEY_NT results (see figure 5).  
The MNPV_NQMB, MNPV_MB and MNPV_NT results, together with the MEY_NQMB, 
MEY_MB and MEY_NT results, highlights the fact that Fleet 3 has a highly inefficient 
selection pattern. And in line with Diekert et al. (2010), it is shown that the utilization of this 
fleet generates a cyclical fishing pattern when the stock management strategy is to maximize 




All in all, the results indicate that the NEA cod stock has biological and economic potential that 
cannot be realized with today’s management policies and overall selection pattern. Biological 
gains in terms of an increase in the sustainable yield can be achieved by altering the selection 
pattern through changes in the fleet-composition. In addition, assuming the international 
distribution of the yearly profits reflects today’s distribution of the TAC, the results indicate 
that significant economic gains in terms of an increase in the net present value for the 
Norwegian part of the fishery can be achieved by changing the fleet-composition and reducing 
the overall fishing pressure.  
In line with Helgesen et al. (2018), I find that the biological optimum optimorum is obtained 
by choosing a stock management strategy that involves maximizing the sustainable yield and 
allocating the entire total quota to the Norwegian conventional fleet (MSY_MB). In line with 
Sumaila (1997), and in contrast with Diekert et al. (2010), I find that the economic optimum 
optimorum is obtained by choosing a stock management strategy that involves maximizing the 
NPV for the Norwegian part of the fishery and allocating the entire TAC to the Norwegian 
conventional fleet (MEY_MB/MNPV_MB). However, the Norwegian trawler fleet is 
competitive and could be utilized without significant economic losses when the stock 
management strategy is to maximize the NPV. Since no economic details are described for the 
Russian and third countries’ trawler fleet it is not possible to conclude that this fleet is 
uncompetitive. However, it is certain that the utilization of this fleet with its current selection 
pattern has a negative impact on the Norwegian part of the fishery. And from an economic sole 
owner perspective, the utilization of this fleet may only be defended if the harvest costs per kg 
are significantly lower for this fleet than for the other fleets.  
The MEY and MNPV results are associated with SSB levels in the range of 3.7 to 4.4 million 
tons. As the spawning stock biomass has varied between 102 thousand tons and 2.66 million 
tons since 1980, and the peak of 2.66 million tons can be partly explained by two particularly 
strong year classes of cod, one could argue that convergence to such high and stable SSB levels 
appears unrealistic. Assuming estimated relationships for natural mortality, weight at age, 
recruitment, gear selectivity etc. are valid for higher stock levels may not be appropriate. And 
the results should be viewed in that context as one is extrapolating outside the range of stock 
sizes explored for the period when data are available. Diekert et al. (2010) who end up with 
optimal cod stock levels in the range of 4.5 to 6 million tons, argue that the cod stock has been 
estimated to have reached 5 million tons in 1936 when the fishing pressure in the Lofoten area 
30 
 
was significant, and that high cod stock levels could be achieved. However, a spawning stock 
biomass of e.g. 4.4 million tons corresponds to a cod stock of about 6 million tons (in the 
MEY_MB and MNPV_MB scenarios), which is higher than the estimated peak level in 1936. 
Furthermore, the cod stock declined following several years of intensive fishing in the 1930s 
(Hylen 2002).  In other words, it is highly uncertain that high and stable cod stock levels well 
above 5 million tons may be achieved with significant fishing pressure.  
In addition to the mentioned uncertainties above, it is important to remember that the model 
presented here is a single-species model. It is possible that high cod stock levels may have 
undesired direct and indirect effects on other commercial stocks such as capelin, herring, shrimp 
and haddock. In addition, the fleets targeting the NEA cod target other species as well. It is 
possible that changes in the selection pattern and fishing pressure on the NEA cod could result 
in unwanted changes in the selection pattern and fishing pressure on other stocks, for which 
fish caught is usually smaller than the NEA cod. Such effects should be accounted for as well.  
Since the NEA cod stock is a shared stock and subject to joint management by Norway and 
Russia, the biological and economic optimum optimorum scenarios may be viewed as highly 
unrealistic scenarios. The scenario in which the stock management strategy and international 
distribution of the TAC remain unchanged, while the distribution of the Norwegian share of the 
TAC is determined endogenously, might be the most interesting and realistic alternative 
scenario simulated. As mentioned, there is currently an ongoing Norwegian debate concerning 
whether “Trålstigen” should be maintained. Therefore, it seems realistic that changes in the 
distribution of the Norwegian share of the TAC could happen. Intuitively, people may think 
that it would be economically beneficial to allocate more of the Norwegian share of the TAC 
to the Norwegian trawler fleet since it typically has higher profit margins than the Norwegian 
conventional fleet (Fiskeridirektoratet 2009-2018). However, the results from the 
MSY_NQMB scenario indicate that it is optimal to allocate the entire Norwegian share of the 
TAC to the Norwegian conventional fleet even though the Norwegian trawler fleet has a higher 
profit margin than the Norwegian conventional fleet in today’s management scenario. Although 
the economic benefits from allocating the entire Norwegian share of the TAC to Norwegian 
conventional vessels may be considered insignificant due to uncertainties in the model, the 




5.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Since the projections of alternative management scenarios rest on empirically estimated 
parameters, and many of the estimates are uncertain due to fundamental uncertainties in marine 
systems, above differences between model and reality and the rough approaches used in the 
estimation of several parameters, the sensitivity of the MEY_MB/MNPV_MB and 
MSY_NQMB outcomes has been tested.  
When raising the costs of the Norwegian conventional fleet by 5%, the Norwegian trawler fleet 
takes over as the producer of the economic optimum optimorum (MEY_MB/MNPV_MB). 
Furthermore, the Norwegian trawler fleet proves to be the economically optimal producer in 
the scenario in which the goal is to maximize the sustainable yield subject to today’s 
international distribution of the TAC (MSY_NQMB). When raising the catchability 
coefficients of the Norwegian trawler fleet by 10%, both the Norwegian conventional fleet and 
trawler fleet are utilized in the optimum optimorum scenario (MEY_MB/MNPV_MB). And as 
in the scenario where the costs of the Norwegian conventional fleet were raised by 5%, the 
Norwegian trawler fleet proves to be the economically optimal producer in the scenario in 
which the goal is to maximize the sustainable yield subject to today’s international distribution 
of the TAC (MSY_NQMB). Raising the average historical price (the basis for the price 
determination in the model) makes the Norwegian trawler fleet better off relative to the 
Norwegian conventional fleet. Considering the uncertainties in the model, these results reaffirm 
that the Norwegian trawler fleet is competitive with the Norwegian conventional fleet.  
 
6 Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Work 
The main objective of this study was to provide a policy-relevant, bioeconomic analysis of 
different management strategies concerning the determination and allocation of the total quota 
for NEA cod. By use of a bioeconomic model, it is shown that the NEA cod fishery has 
biological potential that cannot be realized with today’s management policies and overall 
selection pattern. The same goes for the economic potential of the Norwegian part of the fishery.  
Biological gains in terms of an increase in the sustainable yield may be achieved by changing 
the fleet-composition while maintaining today’s stock management strategy.  Economic gains 
may be achieved by changing the fleet-composition and reducing the overall fishing pressure. 
The Norwegian conventional fleet has the most efficient selection pattern which gives it a 
bioeconomic advantage. However, the Norwegian trawler fleet compensates for a more 
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inefficient selection pattern with a cost-advantage. Economically speaking, the overall results 
indicate that it is not significant which of these fleets are utilized – it is the Russian and third 
countries’ trawler fleet that has the most inefficient selection pattern, and the use of this fleet 
has a negative economic impact on the Norwegian part of the fishery. From an economic sole 
owner perspective, the use of the Russian and third countries’ trawler fleet, with its overall 
selection pattern, may only be defended if its harvest costs per kg are significantly lower than 
that of the other fleets.  
For further work, it could be interesting to include economic details for the Russian and third 
countries’ trawler fleet. Furthermore, more realistic harvest functions could be applied to the 
model – harvest functions that consider the seasonal fishing pattern in the NEA cod fishery and 
possible stock elasticities. Including predator-prey relations and other relevant fish stocks could 
result in a more useful model.  
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Data from IMR 
Table A1: Catch number in thousands by age and fleet for 2015 
 
 






Age Nor trawl Nor other Other countries (trawl) Total
1 10 20 4 34
2 210 270 159 639
3 930 840 2545 4315
4 4130 3090 24163 31383
5 2750 2150 36281 41181
6 5110 3240 42859 51209
7 3440 3670 26635 33745
8 2660 3440 16430 22530
9 1460 7240 14909 23609
10 4810 12290 7453 24553
11 7010 7140 1921 16071
12 830 1220 460 2510
13 420 48 468
14 20 110 4 134
15+ 30 210 14 254
Age Nor trawl Nor other Other countries (trawl) Total
1 10 7 17
2 300 30 294 624
3 1090 560 3584 5234
4 3220 1360 14646 19226
5 5400 2090 30917 38407
6 2500 2600 31533 36633
7 4120 2490 23291 29901
8 7980 12150 35979 56109
9 5430 17080 25030 47540
10 4920 10800 7018 22738
11 440 2120 1157 3717
12 90 740 339 1169
13 190 80 43 313
14 210 0 210
15+ 20 130 7 157
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Table A3: Catch number in thousands by age and fleet for 2013 
 
 









Age Nor trawl Nor other Other countries (trawl) Total
1 0 1 1
2 10 228 238
3 490 170 2243 2903
4 3370 770 9519 13659
5 4130 1920 16702 22752
6 3560 1850 15610 21020
7 8990 6470 38771 54231
8 10240 16580 47631 74451
9 11400 17700 18024 47124
10 900 4460 3783 9143
11 240 1690 1033 2963
12 20 380 294 694
13 40 310 99 449
14 60 29 89
15+ 90 50 5 145
Age Nor trawl Nor other Other countries (trawl) Total
1 44 44
2 167 167
3 410 230 2055 2695
4 1800 670 7992 10462
5 3330 940 12376 16646
6 6300 3790 30282 40372
7 10610 10620 48784 70014
8 7990 13650 26675 48315
9 1540 5800 4986 12326
10 320 3250 1644 5214
11 1210 716 1926
12 10 750 364 1124
13 30 200 87 317
14 10 40 20 70








Age Nor trawl Nor other Other countries (trawl) Total
1 14 14 10 38
2 216 45 172 433
3 201 234 983 1418
4 2601 1334 4100 8035
5 5571 3600 23304 32475
6 11248 8539 51158 70945
7 13110 12653 48127 73890
8 2228 7401 11507 21136
9 1722 6314 3683 11719
10 1088 2684 1292 5064
11 876 1531 832 3239
12 10 370 220 600
13 120 249 65 434
14 12
15+
